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Abstract: Recent research finds that markups are rising, suggesting declining competition.
But does less price competition mean less Schumpeterian “creative destruction”/industry
dynamism? This paper reports the first recent estimates of trends in the displacement of
industry-leading firms. Displacement hazards rose for several decades since 1970 but have
declined sharply since 2000. Using a production function-based model to explore the role of
investments, acquisitions, and lobbying, we find that investments by dominant firms in
intangibles, especially software, are distinctly associated with greater persistence and reduced
leapfrogging. Software investments by top firms soared around 2000, contributing
substantially to the decline. Also, higher markups are associated with greater displacement
hazards, linking rents positively with industry dynamism. While technology is often seen as
disrupting industry leaders, it now appears to help suppress disruption.
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Introduction
Studies find evidence of rising firm markups and profit shares1 and of rising industry
concentration at the national level.2 Many economists and policymakers are concerned about
declining competition in the US and in other developed economies. Generally, declining
competition is troubling for two very different reasons, one static and the other dynamic: 1)
without sufficient competition, firms acquire market power allowing them to raise prices and
lower output, creating allocative inefficiencies,3 and, 2) low competition may reflect barriers
that block firms with innovative new technologies from entering, growing, and replacing
firms that use older, less productive technologies; the result is a decline in industrial
dynamism and productivity growth. Economists have suggested that declining competition is
related to declining firm startup rates, slower labor reallocation to more productive firms,
and declining investment (see for example Furman 2016, Crouzet and Eberly 2018).
However, there is considerable tension between the notion of static price
competition and Schumpeterian technological competition. While markups measure price
competition by quantifying the deviation of prices from marginal cost, markups may be
orthogonal to technological competition. Firms with innovative new technologies may earn
rents, allowing them to charge higher markups. For instance, Bessen (2020) and Criscuolo et
al. (2018) find positive links between information technology (IT) investments and markups
or profit margins.

De Loecker and Eeckhout, and Unger (2020), Barkai (2017), Hall (2018), Baqaee and Fahri (2017); see Basu
(2019) and Syverson (2019) for reviews.
1

Grullon et al. (2019), Autor et al. (2020), Gutierrez and Philippon (2017, 2019), Bessen (2020) but also see
Rinz (2018), Hsieh and Rossi-Hansberg (2019), and Berry et al. (2019).
2

3

Including, possibly, monopsony power in labor markets.
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A complete understanding of competition requires additional metrics. This paper
measures Schumpeterian competition, explores how it has changed over recent decades, and
identifies what appear to be the main barriers to Schumpeterian competition. We also look at
the relationship between Schumpeterian competition and other measures of competition,
specifically markups and industry concentration.
We use two main measures of Schumpeterian “creative destruction”: 1) the annual
displacement hazard that a firm ranked top four by sales in its industry falls out of the top
four, and, 2) the annual hazard that a firm ranked fifth through eighth leapfrogs into the top
four. We model these probabilities using a simple extension of a standard production
function. We assume that firms optimize variable inputs so that each firm’s revenues are a
reduced-form function of the firm’s idiosyncratic productivity, the firm’s capital, and—
because of strategic interaction—capital stocks of rival firms. Then, under some simple
assumptions, displacement and leapfrogging probabilities can be expressed as functions of
firm productivity and firm investments, including those of rivals. This allows us to use
regression analysis to explore the extent to which different kinds of capital affect the hazard
rates and can account for the observed trends. We consider a variety of capital stocks
including physical capital, intangibles, R&D, patents, organizational capital, different types of
software, advertising and marketing, lobbying, and acquisitions.
Our first finding is that displacement and leapfrogging hazards exhibit a sharp break
in trend: after rising robustly for many decades, they fell sharply starting around the year
2000. To fix ideas, it is helpful to preview a result developed more completely below. Figure
1 shows several annual measures of Schumpeterian turnover along with the best-fit linear
trends with a single break, where the break years are determined by Wald supremum tests.
Panels A, C, and D show displacement hazards; panel B shows a leapfrogging hazard. Below
3
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we discuss the details of these measures and also a number of alternative metrics. The
picture that emerges is this: turnover of market leaders rose substantially from 1970 through
the 1990s, but around 2000 the turnover rates began dropping. The change was sharp and
substantial and across most sectors, suggesting a major shift in the nature of Schumpeterian
competition.
Second, we explore the roles of different capital stocks in accounting for these shifts.
We find that rising investments in intangibles generally and in software in particular can
account for most of the drop in displacement and leapfrogging hazards since 2000.
Intangible and software investments by top firms appear to impose a negative externality on
second-tier firms, reducing their leapfrogging probabilities. Dominant firms increased their
investment in software by an order of magnitude around 2000. Even relative to second-tier
firms ranked 5-8, the top four firms more than doubled their software stocks. Moreover,
using Census microdata and BEA industry data, it appears that this relationship is largely
driven by own account (self-developed) software, which is substantially dominated by large
firms. An instrumental variable analysis provides some support for the idea that the impact
of own-account software on displacement hazards may be causal. We discuss why software
might be playing this role.
We find little to support the view that declining competition has resulted from lax
antitrust merger enforcement. Mergers and acquisitions by top firms do not significantly
reduce displacement and acquisitions by top firms have been declining. Nor does lobbying
appear to have much influence on the persistence of dominant firms.
Finally, we look at the correlations between displacement hazards and industry
markups and concentration. We find that industries with higher markups actually have
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higher rates of displacement, implying that markups are not a reliable indicator of industry
dynamism. Displacement hazards are negatively associated with industry concentration.
This analysis provides a richer picture of the nature of competition, including
different kinds of competition. And it highlights the possibility that software technology is
playing a new and different economic role recently. This paper makes three major
contributions. First, we report changes in the displacement hazard for top firms ranked by
sales in industries over time, for the first time in the literature, finding a sharp reversal of
trend around 2000.4 Second, we develop a model that includes strategic interaction and,
using firm level data, we obtain estimates of the link between investments made by dominant
firms and their risk of being leapfrogged, including the negative externalities these
investments exert on other firms. Third, we explore the associations between displacement
hazards of market leaders, their markups, and industry concentration.

Literature
Joseph Schumpeter (1942, p. 84) held that what matters in “capitalist reality” is
innovation, both technological and organizational. Innovative firms can command a decisive
cost or quality advantage that allows them to grow and to displace existing firms in a
“perennial gale of creative destruction.” In dynamic industries, innovative firms will enter
new markets and they will grow until they displace firms using inferior technologies or

Autor et al. (2020, Figure A14), in a subsidiary analysis, report changes in the persistence of the top 500 firms
in Compustat. McKinsey consultants have tabulated a “topple rate” for firms finding a rise up to 2002
(Viguerie and Thompson 2005). Covarrubius et al. (2019) look at displacement of top firms ranked by profits
or market value. While they find a similar drop in displacement hazards, their measures are noisier and less
indicative of market dominance. For instance, Amazon long had a low profit ranking because it reinvested at a
high level. In any case, we find that sales-based measures are more precise and show a larger and sharper break
in trend.
4
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business models. Substantial empirical evidence supports the proposition that greater
contestability of sales encourages firms to improve efficiency and invest in R&D (Shapiro
2012, but see also Gilbert 2006). Many economists see industrial dynamism as highly
important for long term productivity growth—perhaps more important than static
deadweight losses arising from insufficient price competition.
Hence, it might be helpful to obtain direct measures of “creative destruction” and
see how they have changed over time. There is a literature on the persistence of dominant
firms that seeks to establish the degree of persistence of industry leadership and to identify
correlated industry characteristics (Caves 1998; Davies and Geroski 1997; Doi 2001; Franko
2003; Geroski and Toker 1996; Honjo et al. 2018; Kato and Honjo 2006, 2009; Sutton 2007).
However, while this literature has looked at levels of displacement hazards it has not looked
at time trends, as we do. Furthermore, while the literature explores correlated industry
characteristics, we explore a range of firm level investments that might affect displacement
hazards, including possible strategic interaction.
The displacement of market leaders is, of course, not the only measure of industrial
dynamism. Some papers have studied changes in firm entry rates (Hathaway and Litan
2014a,b; Guzman and Stern 2016; Gutierrez and Philippon 2019) and others have studied
the growth rates of productive firms (Decker et al. 2018). However, the displacement of
incumbent market leaders by innovators is the “finish line” of Schumpeterian competition,
making displacement hazards an important dimension of industrial dynamism.
We can gain some insight as to what might be driving the sharp change in
displacement hazards by looking at associated firm investments. In many models of
industrial organization, firms can make investments to bolster their market shares. For
example, in the classic Cournot model, firms invest in capacity. In endogenous sunk cost
6
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models (Sutton 1991), firms improve the perceived quality of their products through
investments in advertising or R&D. The persistence of dominance literature identifies
several industry-level investments associated with persistence, including R&D and
advertising (Geroski and Toker 1996). Using firm microdata, we can better identify the role
of specific investments as barriers to mobility. This is particularly important because firms
dramatically increased their investments in some forms of capital since the 1990s, notably
intangibles and software.5
Our analysis is related to a literature on the persistence of firm profits across all firms
within each industry (see Bennett and Gartenberg 2016 for a recent review). Beginning with
Mueller (1977), a substantial literature looks at the persistence of profits for all firms within
industries. A few of these studies have looked at trends in persistence of profits over time.
Examining US firms through the 1990s, Wiggins and Ruefli (2005) and Gschwandtner
(2012) find a decline in persistence/increase in competition; McNamara et al. (2003) find no
significant change. Looking beyond the 1990s, there is some evidence of a reversal. Bennett
and Gartenberg (2016) find declining persistence of return on assets until about 2000 and
rising persistence after that plus some evidence of a link to software. Bennett (2020),
measuring production function autocorrelation finds decreasing persistence until around
2000, a reversal, and then a subsequent decline.
We begin by describing the diverse data sources we use. We then present alternative
measures of trends in displacement and leapfrogging hazards, followed by analysis of the

Byrne, Oliner, Sichel (2013); Corrado, Hulten, Sichel (2009); BEA, “National Income and Product Accounts,”
Table 9.4u, Software Investment and Prices.
5
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associations between these hazards and firm investments. We then explore the association
between displacement hazards, firm markups, and industry concentration and then conclude.

Data
Datasets
Our main dataset consists of Compustat firms traded in US currency with positive
sales, including firms with headquarters outside the US. Because of data limitations (see
below), we primarily use years 1976 – 2017. To identify industries in these data, we use the
historical NAICS assignments made by Standard & Poors, projecting backwards for years
before NAICS coverage. Because NAICS coding changes every five years, we map these
NAICS codes to the 2012 version for continuity. Compustat primarily includes publicly
listed firms and reported sales include all global operations.
A second dataset is the National Establishment Time Series (NETS), a product of
Walls & Associates, derived from the Dun & Bradstreet Marketing Information File. NETS
consists of establishment-level longitudinal data covering, in principle, the universe of U.S.
business establishments, private and public. We aggregated the establishments from 1990 –
2014, assigning firms to 8-digit SIC codes based on the primary line of business. Robustness
checks based on coarser industry categories did not find substantially different results.
Each of these datasets has limitations. Compustat misses most private firms,
however, the largest firms in most industries tend to be publicly listed, so displacement rates
of top four firms should still be reasonably accurate.6 NETS is known to over-represent very

Tracking the 100 largest firms in the NETS database each year from 1990 – 2014, 77% of the observations
are publicly listed.
6
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small firms, but that shortcoming should not affect our analyses on dominant firms that tend
to be large (Barnatchez, Crane and Decker, 2017).
We also use confidential microdata from the Annual Capital Expenditures Survey
(ACES) of the US Census from 2002 – 2012. This survey provides data on capital spending
for new and used structures and equipment by U.S. nonfarm businesses, most importantly,
spending on three types of software: pre-packaged, custom (contract), and own-developed.
These microdata aggregate sales and capital expenditures of US establishments to the firm
level, assigning the firm to a 3 or 4-digit NAICS code based on the largest business line.
Finally, we used industry level data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
that also includes measures of software investment by type. We supplement these data with
measures of investment, including software investment, in EU countries from EU KLEMS.
We use these latter data in an instrumental variable analysis.

Variables
Our basic measure of displacement hazard is the probability that a firm that was
ranked among the top four firms in its industry by sales last year is ranked below the top
four this year. While we test alternative definitions below and perform additional robustness
checks, this basic measure excludes firms that are not included in the dataset for the current
year but includes firms that change industries.
We use a variety of capital stocks in our analysis. All are deflated and all are
beginning-of-year stocks, that is, they are lags of the end-of-year stocks that are typically
reported. For tangible capital, we use net property, plant, and equipment from firm balance
sheets. Peters and Taylor (2017) have developed measures of intangible capital based on
three components: knowledge capital derived from R&D spending, organizational capital
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derived from Sales, General, and Administrative expenditures, and balance sheet intangibles.
These values are available from 1975 through 2016.7
We also obtained data on other detailed intangible investments and computed capital
stocks using the perpetual inventory method:
•
•
•

Data on advertising and marketing expenditures come from Compustat.
Following Villalonga (2004), we calculate stocks using a 5% pre-sample
growth rate and 45% depreciation rate.
Data on patents come from Autor et al. (forthcoming), who use a 15%
depreciation rate to compute patent stocks and who matched the data to
Compustat.
Data on lobbying expenditures since 1998 come from Center for Responsive
Politics.8 We use a 6% pre-sample growth rate and a 25% depreciation rate.
We matched these data to Compustat using the company name (the client
parent entity).9

We also wanted to measure investments that firms make in developing proprietary
software for their internal use. To do this, we obtained LinkedIn resume data and identified
1,791 job titles that pertained to software development jobs (see details in Bessen and Righi
2019). We tabulated the number of these employees, adjusted the numbers to account for
differences in LinkedIn coverage over time, and matched the firms to Compustat from 1990
– 2012.10 We then constructed software stocks treating the employment of software

Following Peters and Taylor’s advice we exclude firms with less than $5 million gross PPE in 1990 dollars,
firms in finance or utility industries, and we trim the 1% tails in Tobin’s q.
7

8

http://www.opensecrets.org/resources/create/data_doc.php accessed 2016.

Of 19,359 entities (companies, unions, trade associations, other organizations), we matched 11% to
Compustat firms; these firms accounted for 53% of all lobbying expenditures.
9

10

The match covers firms that account for 68% of the employees in Compustat in 1990, rising to over 90% of
the employees in 2012. To adjust for changes in coverage over time, we scaled the LinkedIn counts of software
employees by the ratio of software employees to all employees in the Current Population Survey to the ratio of
software employees to all employees in LinkedIn.
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developers as an investment, using a 33% depreciation rate and an 8% pre-sample growth
rate.
We also evaluate acquisitions as a kind of investment. To the extent that acquisitions
generate goodwill—that is, to the extent that acquirers pay more than the book value of
assets of acquired firms—they show up as balance sheet intangibles in the Peters and Taylor
accounting. While goodwill captures the values of acquisitions, we also wanted to count the
number of acquisitions made by large firms because even small-value transactions might
confer significant technological advantage to dominant firms. We obtained a list of mergers
and acquisitions from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database and matched these to
Compustat.11 To create acquisition stocks, we accumulated the number of transactions
assuming a 15% depreciation rate and 8% pre-sample growth rate. To check the robustness
of this procedure, we also used simple lagged acquisition flows and obtained similar results.
To compute firm productivity, we follow common practice (see Keller and Yeaple
2009), imputing materials and value added for the productivity estimates as follows: materials
is cost of goods sold plus sales, general, and administrative expense less depreciation less the
wage bill. Where the wage bill is not reported, we impute it as firm employment times the
industry mean wage taken from the BEA. Value added is revenues minus materials.
Finally, we estimate firm markups using the method of De Loecker, Eeckhout, and
Unger (2020) which is based on De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) (see Appendix).
Summary statistics can be found in Appendix A1.

These data primarily consist of announced transactions. Public companies are not required to announce all
mergers and acquisitions; however, the list tends to include transactions that are materially significant or where
the acquired company has customers or suppliers who need to be informed. In practice, the number of
announced transactions far exceed the number of transactions reported to the FTC under the Hart-ScottRodino reporting requirements. We matched CUSIPs in the SDC data to permnos in CRSP to gvkeys in
Compustat producing over 100,000 matched transactions.
11
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Empirical Findings
The persistence of dominance
The literature cited above on the persistence of dominance measures persistence by
the hazard that leading firms will lose their leadership positions. In this paper, we use large
samples, we estimate changing trends in the hazard of changes in leadership, and we relate
these to a variety of firm investments.
Our baseline measure is the annual hazard that a firm that was in the top four firms
in its primary industry (6-digit NAICS in Compustat) ranked by revenue last year is no
longer in the top four firms this year (not counting firms that exit Compustat). This hazard is
shown in Figure 1A.12 The line represents the best-fit linear trend with a single break where
the break year is determined by the supremum Wald test. In this case, the estimated break
year is 2000. Table 1, row 1, displays the resulting regression coefficients for the baseline
trend and change in trend after the break year. That is, for break year 𝜏, we estimate the
annual hazard over time t
ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝛽 ∙ min[0, 𝑡 − 𝜏] + 𝐶 + 𝜖𝑡 .

where C is a constant. The estimated coefficients for both the trend and the change in trend
are substantial, the change is negative, and the coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
The remaining panels of Figure 1 and the additional rows in Table 1 explore a variety
of alternative measures, alternative industry definitions, and alternative datasets to test the

Note that while the number of firms listed in Compustat has declined substantially since 2000, the number of
large firms (e.g., those with over $1 billion in sales in 2009 $) has not. The rankings of the top firms should
therefore not be significantly affected by the decline in total firms listed.
12
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robustness of this finding. The second row of Table 1 considers the displacement hazard for
a firm in the top 2 within its industry and the third row considers the displacement hazard
for a firm in the top 8. The fourth row measures the combined hazard of being displaced
from the top 4 firms or of exiting the Compustat dataset (no longer publicly listed). The fifth
row considers the hazard that a firm ranked 5-9 in the previous year enters the top 4 firms.
All show a substantial change from a positive to negative trend around 2000.
One concern about these measures regards the definition of the relevant industries.
Broad national industrial categories, even at the 6-digit level, do not always reflect the
product markets that would be used, say, in merger analysis. It seems, however, that the
change in the persistence of dominance is robust to particular industry definitions. Row 6
uses 4-digit NAICS; row 7 uses no industry definitions but looks instead at the persistence of
firms within the top 100 of all firms in Compustat; row 8 uses Compustat industry segment
data for multi-product firms. Top firms have remained more dominant even among groups
of firms that compete only in some markets or not at all.
Compustat does not include most private firms, although most dominant firms are
publicly listed. Also, firm sales in Compustat are global sales. It might be informative to
measure sales just within the United States, including private firms, to understand domestic
persistence of dominance. Row 9 shows results for the NETS database using 8-digit SIC
industries where firm sales are calculated as the sum of sales at US establishments. While the
time period for the NETS data only begins in 1990, we find a similar break in trend.
Finally, this change in trend is observed across sectors. Table A2 in the Appendix
shows regression results for a variety of sectors in both Compustat and NETS data, all
showing a similar pattern, although not always statistically significant and with breaks

13
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occurring in different years. Furthermore, the pattern is similar if firms are weighted by real
sales in the calculation of annual hazards (not shown, available on request).
In summary, across a wide range of measures, the displacement of dominant firms
rose from 1970 until the late 1990s. Then, somewhere around year 2000, this trend sharply
reversed with substantial declines in the displacement rate. Displacement hazards have
declined roughly half a percentage point per year since then. This change represents a
substantial decline in Schumpeterian competition and implies a marked and rapid change in
industrial structure.

Investments in dominance
A model of leapfrogging
What might be behind this sharp decline? Some papers on the persistence of
dominance have explored industry characteristics that are associated with the displacement
of market leaders, including industry growth, industry concentration, and R&D intensity.
However, only limited inferences can be drawn using industry level data because firm
behavior may differ significantly—dominant firms may behave differently than their rivals
and those differences might be key to understanding their persistence. For this reason, it is
important to understand which specific investments by dominant firms are most associated
with their persistence and also, possibly, which investments by smaller firms are most
associated with the occurrence of leapfrogging. Such analysis can provide important clues as
to the mechanisms underlying the recent decline of disruption.
We conduct this inquiry in the context of an extended production function. Initially,
consider a duopoly consisting of firm 1 and 2, where 1 has smaller revenue at time t – 1. We

14
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assume a Cobb Douglas revenue production function with an additional term for rival’s
capital. Let the log revenue of firm i at time t, designating the other firm as -i, be
(1)
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 0 𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽0 𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 0 𝑘−𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡
where l is log labor, k is log of beginning-of-year capital, 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is firm productivity, and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is
an error term of mean zero and independent of the right-hand side variables. The variable
𝑘−𝑖𝑡 captures the notion that firm investments can exert an externality on other firms’
revenues. For example, in a classic Cournot duopoly one firm’s investment in capacity shifts
the other firm’s demand curve.
Allowing the firm to optimize labor in each period given capital stocks and
productivity yields a reduced form equation
(2)
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 1 𝑘−𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿 1𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡
Sutton (2007) finds that the shocks to firm’s market shares are independent of each other,
so, without significant loss of generality we can model the errors as a normal distribution,
𝜇𝑖𝑡 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑡 ).13 Then the probability of a change in market leadership at time t is
(3)
𝑃[𝑦−𝑖𝑡 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡 ] = 1 − Φ (

𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦−𝑖𝑡
√2𝜎𝑡

) = Φ (−

𝑦−𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡
√2𝜎𝑡

)

This assumes that both firms have the same error distribution. Allowing different variances does not
significantly alter the specification.
13
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where Φ is the standard normal distribution function. Taking a linear approximation of Φ,
and capturing differences in 𝜎 with fixed effects for year and industry j, we get a linear
probability model,14
(4)
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + γω𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑘−𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 .
This equation can represent either the probability that a leader firm becomes a follower or
the probability that a follower firm leapfrogs into leadership. When the dependent variable is
the displacement hazard of a leading firm, we expect 𝛾, 𝛽1 < 0, 𝛽2 > 0. When the
dependent variable is a leapfrogging probability, we expect 𝛾, 𝛽1 > 0, 𝛽2 < 0.
Empirical implementation
Equation (4) can be readily extended to accommodate more than two firms. To
explore the displacement hazard of top firms, we use a sample consisting of firms ranked in
the top four by sales the previous year. In this case, we include capital stocks, 𝑘−𝑖𝑡 , for firms
ranked 5 – 8 or an average of these. These are the firms most likely to displace the subject
firm. To explore leapfrogging hazards, the sample consists of firm ranked 5 – 8 and we
include capital stocks of firms ranked 1 – 4.
Also, equation (4) can include multiple capital stocks. Our base specification includes
tangible capital (property, plant, and equipment) and intangible capital. We also decompose
intangible capital into a range of component stocks.

In this specification, 𝜔−𝑖𝑡 is included in the error term, although this is not necessary. Also note that this
specification accommodates differences in coefficients between dominant and other firms.
14
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In our data the capital stocks are observed, but firm productivity is not. Obtaining
estimates of productivity for each firm each year is important to avoid biasing the capital
stock estimates. For example, if better managers made the firm more productive and less
likely to be displaced and if better managers also invested relatively more in intangible
capital, then omitting the productivity measure, will bias the coefficient for intangible capital.
To obtain measures of productivity, we use a two-step procedure. First, we estimate
equation (1) for the sample of all firms, obtaining firm-year productivity estimates, 𝜔
̂𝑖𝑡 . Then
we regress equation (4) for the limited sample of subject firms (top four or second four),
using our productivity estimates as a control variable. Because we are using an estimated
variable in our second step, we bootstrap to obtain standard errors.
We estimate equation (1) using log value added as the dependent variable and log
labor, log tangible capital, and log intangible capital as the independent variables. We also
experimented with different measures of 𝑘−𝑖𝑡 , but these made little difference to the
coefficients obtained.15
To obtain estimates of productivity, 𝜔𝑖𝑡 , independently of the error term, 𝜈𝑖𝑡 , we use
the Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) control function method. Note that control
function methods of estimating production functions—Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015)— are two step procedures that
generate estimates of 𝜔𝑖𝑡 in their first stages. Using OLS or other techniques for estimating
production functions, a rough measure of productivity might also be obtained by taking the
residual of the estimated equation. However, that residual equals 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 and, since 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is

Our base specification calculates it as the log of the sum of capital for all firms in the industry excluding the
subject firm. While this term has a statistically significant coefficient, it made little difference in the productivity
estimates. The correlation between productivity including it and excluding it altogether is .9974.
15
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correlated with the error in our second stage regression, 𝜖𝑖𝑡 , by construction, using these
residuals will lead to biased estimates.
To check the robustness of our estimation choice, Table A3 in the Appendix
compares estimates of equation (4) using different productivity measures. The results differ
little, especially across the different control function methods.
Displacement hazard
Table 2 shows basic estimates of (3) for the top four firms in each 6-digit NAICS
industry in Compustat, using stocks for tangible and intangible capital and omitting the
terms for other firms. The sample includes only firms that were in the top four last year and
the outcome variable is 1 for those that are ranked out of the top four in the current year
and 0 otherwise. Column 1 shows that productivity and both capital stocks are significantly
associated with the displacement hazard. The coefficient for intangible capital is somewhat
larger in absolute magnitude than the coefficient for tangible capital, but the difference is not
statistically significant. To gauge the economic significance of these estimates, from 1995 to
2017 the sample mean hazard rate declined 7.7% while the mean of log tangible capital
increased 1.55 and the mean of log intangible capital increased 2.03. Intangible capital is
associated with a larger contribution to declining turnover by virtue of its greater growth and
higher coefficient.
It is possible that the coefficient estimates might be biased for a number of reasons.
First, independent changes in industry characteristics might affect both the dependent
variable and firm’s decisions to invest in capital stocks. For instance, a decline in industry
volatility might reduce displacement hazards and also provide more favorable conditions for
firms to invest. To control for changing industry conditions, Column 2 includes separate
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year fixed effects for each industry. With these additional controls, the coefficients are larger
in absolute magnitude.
Another bias might arise if firms anticipate changes in volatility in advance, investing
or disinvesting prior to the disruption. In this case, the capital stocks might be correlated
with the error term. Column 3 conducts an instrumental variable regression with fixed
effects, using the five-year lags of the capital stocks as instruments. Firms are much less
likely to anticipate changes in volatility five years in advance, so these lagged stocks should
not be much influenced by expectations of future volatility yet they are correlated with
subsequent capital stocks by construction.16 The coefficients are quite similar to the OLS
estimates and the null hypothesis that the capital stocks are exogenous cannot be rejected
(probability value of .153).
Columns 4 and 5 repeat the regression in Column 1 over different time periods. It
appears that after 2000 the coefficient on tangible capital fell substantially while the
coefficient on intangible capital rose. This shift suggests that intangibles are associated with
larger decreases in turnover after 2000, perhaps because firms received a greater payoff to
these investments. That view is supported by the relative capital stocks of top four firms
shown in Figure 2. Both stocks have grown substantially since the mid-1990s. But around
2000, relative investment in intangibles grew much more rapidly, more than doubling
intangible stocks relative to tangible capital. Both this shift in investment and the shift in
coefficients suggests that the rise of intangibles is important in understanding the reversal in
displacement hazards following 2000.

The first stage regression indicates that the instrument is not weak; an F-test of the joint significance of the
explanatory variables has a statistics of 405.6.
16
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Finally, note that the decline in turnover of market leaders is not the result of
declining volatility in markets, 𝜎𝑡 . Both the variance of the residual in (1) and of productivity,
𝜔𝑖𝑡 , have been rising.17 The rising persistence of market leaders has been occurring despite a
general increase in market turbulence.
Externalities
The regressions in Table 2 omit the terms in equation (3) for the capital of rival
firms. The omitted terms might be correlated with the error term, biasing the coefficients.
Table 3 explores interactions between the top four firms in each industry with the second
four firms, those ranked 5 – 8. Column 1 adds the capital stocks of the second-tier firms to
the regression in Table 2, column 1. The coefficients for the subject firm are indeed larger.
But neither the second-tier firms’ investments in tangible capital or intangible capital appear
to have a significant effect on the top tier firms. Also, the joint probabilities that second-tier
firms’ investments affect the displacement hazard of the top firms (the bottom two rows of
the table) are not significant.
The second column of Table 3 shows the corresponding regression for the secondtier firms. The dependent variable is now the probability that a firm that was ranked 5 – 8
last year leapfrogs into the top four firms. Here, the investments made by the top four firms
significantly affect the leapfrog probability, both individually and jointly. The tangible capital
investments of the third and fourth ranked firms reduces the leapfrog probability. In effect,

The variance of the change in 𝜔𝑖𝑡 rises from .083 up through 2000 to .117 after 2000; the variance in the
change in the total residual rises from .092 to .124.
17
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these investments increase the revenues of the third and fourth ranked firms and thus raise
the hurdle that second-tier firms need to overcome.
The pattern for investments made by the top four firms in intangibles, however,
exhibits a markedly different pattern. Here, it is the largest firm’s investment that has the
biggest coefficient. This suggests that intangibles play a different role—they don’t so much
raise the hurdle to leapfrogging as they depress the relative revenues of second-tier firms.
That is, to the extent that intangibles raise the hurdle that second tier firms need to
overcome, that effect should mostly appear in the coefficients of the fourth and third ranked
firms, the firms that are most at risk of being leapfrogged. The large coefficient for the
biggest firm suggests that the role of intangibles may be in the negative externality these
investments exert on smaller firms rather than their role in raising firm revenues and thus
raising the leapfrogging hurdle. Recall that in equation (1), investments play a dual role: they
raise the revenue of the subject firm and they also exert a negative externality on demand for
other firms. Intangibles may play a role in “business stealing.” Given the dramatic shift
towards intangible investment by the top four firms seen in Figure 2, these externalities may
represent important “barriers to mobility” that appear to play a major role in the decline in
displacement and leapfrogging.
Decomposing intangibles
Which specific intangibles are involved in these interactions? It is interesting to
decompose the aggregate firm intangible stocks into components. To explore the relative
influence of different types of intangibles, it is helpful to simplify the regression in Table 3,
column 2. Specifically, we aggregate the intangible stocks of the top four firms and only
include the tangible stocks of the firms ranked third and fourth the previous year since these
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are the stocks that significantly affect leapfrogging. A likelihood ratio test does not reject
these restrictions (probability value of .703).18
Column 1 of Table 4 shows the components of Peters and Taylor’s (2016) intangible
capital: a stock of R&D investments, a stock of organizational capital (derived from Sales,
General, and Administrative expenditures), and balance sheet intangibles, which consist
substantially of goodwill accumulated from firm mergers and acquisitions. Organizational
capital and other intangibles are important for the subject firm’s probability of leapfrogging.
Of the investments made by top four firms, only investments in organizational capital are
economically and statistically significant.19
Organizational capital includes spending on advertising and marketing, lobbying, and
software development where software is not part of the product. Columns 2 – 4 include
measures of specific intangible stocks including software, acquisitions, advertising and
marketing, lobbying expenditures, and patents. Because we want to focus on organizational
capital, columns 2 and 3 exclude industries where software is a major part of the product.20
This restriction isolates the general effect of own-developed software on competition across
all sectors, aside from the role that software plays as a cost of goods sold. These regressions
cover 1991 – 2012 because of data limitations. Column 4 includes all industries, but only

To minimize problems of firms with missing or zero stocks, we use the logs of average stocks of the top four
firms rather than the sum of individual log stocks in Table 4.
18

When the regression is run using just the organizational capital of the largest firm in each industry, the
coefficient on organizational capital is highly significant, -.016 (.006).
19

These industries are NAICS 5112, software publishers, 5181, Internet service providers and web search
portals, 5182, Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services, 5191 Other information services, 5415
Computer Systems Design and Related Services, 3341 Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing,
3342 Communications Equipment Manufacturing, 3344 Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component
Manufacturing, and 3345 Navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments manufacturing.
20
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years 1999 – 2014 when lobbying data are available. Of the detailed investments made by top
firms, only software and patent stocks have statistically significant coefficients, both for the
subject firm and for the investments of top-four firms.
The importance of information technology is also seen in Figure 3. Top four firms
dramatically increased their software investments since around 2000 compared to the other
intangible stocks.21 This difference is seen both in the level capital stocks for the top four
firms (top panel) and also in the stocks of top four firms compared to the second-tier firms
ranked 5-8 (bottom panel). To estimate the combined impact of the growth in software
capital, multiply the change in the log software capital stock in Figure 3 (about 2) times the
coefficient of top firm software from column 3 (-.014) to get a reduction in the leapfrog
probability of about 2.5 – 3 percent (2 x -.014). Looking at the decline in the aggregate
leapfrog hazard in Figure 1B, the increase in software investment by top four firms accounts
for most of it. Software spending by dominant firms might present a substantial barrier to
mobility.
Some researchers have suggested that a decline in competition has resulted from
mergers and acquisitions that have been permitted by overly lax antitrust enforcement
(Grullon et al. 2019). Acquisitions do not appear to play much role in the increased
persistence of market-leading firms. Figure 3 shows that the stock of acquisitions by top
firms remained flat since 2000. Figure 4 shows the mean acquisitions per year for top four
firms. These have declined since the late 1990s, making it difficult to attribute a decline in
competition to excessive acquisitions since then.

21

The software line in the figure also excludes industries where software is a major part of the product.
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Different types of software investment
The software stock measure used above is built from employment flows of software
developers. These flows represent firm investment in developing their own software. Firms
also purchase software services (custom programming) and pre-packaged software. We can
look at the relative roles of different types of software investment in the US using data from
the Census ACES survey and also using industry level data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). The industry level data also permit us to perform instrumental variable
estimation.
[ACES results are awaiting Census disclosure]
The BEA provides a longer time series on software investments at the industry level.
We calculate annual displacement hazards from the NETS data aggregated to BEA industry
classifications for the US from 1990 through 2014. Since software investment is dominated
by the largest firms in each industry,22 we use the share of software capital in total capital as
an independent variable. We scale other capital stocks similarly. Table 5 reports regression
results the annual displacement hazard using all software (column 1) and different types of
software (column 2), both with controls for stocks of equipment and structures as well. All
regressions have industry and year fixed effects, they are weighted by the number of firms in
each industry to reduce heteroscedasticity arising from sampling variance,23 and standard

Using CPS data from 2000-2014, 38% of software developers work at firms with more than 1000 employees.
The ACES data show that the largest firms spend dramatically more on own-account software in proportion to
their total investments.
22

The number of firms per industry vary by two orders of magnitude, creating substantial differences in
sampling variance.
23

24
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3682745

errors are clustered by industry. Software in general and own-account software in particular
have significant negative coefficients.
Some scholars suggest that competition has declined in the US relative to Europe
because of lax antitrust enforcement or corporate lobbying.24 Perhaps software investment
endogenously responds to these exogenous changes in competition, creating a spurious
correlation. To correct for possible endogeneity, columns 3 and 4 report an instrumental
variable estimation. We instrument the software share (column 3) and the own-account
software share (column 4) using the software share of capital for European countries
obtained from the EU KLEMS database. Since European businesses likely respond to
similar technological opportunities as do US businesses, software investment should exhibit
similar variation across industries.25 But European software investment is plausibly
independent of factors that might influence the displacement of leaders in US markets. The
IV regression coefficients have the same signs, are larger in magnitude, but are less precise.26
Thus, both at the firm and industry levels, the rate of displacement of dominant
firms is negatively related to investments in own-account software and this relationship
appears to be independent of US political economic factors.
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Grullon et al. (2019); Philippon (2019).
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Our first stage regressions are highly significant.

The first stage regression indicates that the instrument is not weak with an F-test of joint significance of the
explanatory variables of 705.1. An overidentification test for covariate balance cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the covariates are balanced (χ2=4.386; p<0.986).
26
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Discussion: Why software?
Large firm investments in all types of intangibles have risen since 2000. But
investment in software has risen dramatically more in proportion, software investment by
top four firms has risen sharply even relative to large second-tier firms, and software
investments by top firms appear to play a unique role in suppressing leapfrogging by secondtier firms. Moreover, the reversal in trend of the displacement hazard occurred just as
investment in software by top four firms surged starting in the late 1990s. Of course, other
developments affected some industries around this time, such as the China Shock and the
dotcom bubble, but both the decline in displacement hazards and the surge in software
investment happened across all sectors, not just those directly affected by China trade or
dotcom firms. The decline of Schumpeterian competition appears to be more than a general
story just about the rise of intangibles. Both large and small firms in many industries now
invest more in intangibles generally, but information technology appears to play a particular
asymmetric role, advantaging large firms at the expense of smaller ones. It is helpful to
speculate why this might be.
To get a sense of why software might have a similar impact on competition across a
wide range of industries, it is helpful to look at some examples. Many of the large IT systems
used by dominant firms share a common purpose: they allow firms to improve the quality of
products and services by managing complexity. Consider:
•

Retailers such as Amazon and Walmart are able to use logistics and inventory
management systems to offer customers much greater selection and to
respond to demand changes much more rapidly despite the larger number of
items for sale.

•

Large manufacturers are able to design products such as airplanes and
automobiles with many more features using expensive custom CAD/CAM
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systems and software components. Modern cars have over 100 computers
and over 100 million lines of software code.
•

Using large amounts of data, online platform advertising companies like
Google and Facebook are able to target prospective consumers with highly
tailored ads, delivering better quality to advertisers.

•

Financial institutions use large software systems to similarly target credit
offers, managing both marketing and risk.

All of these systems in diverse industries allow market leaders to manage a higher degree of
complexity than their rivals, thus delivering better quality products and services.
Why might complex systems provide greater advantage to dominant firms? Some
researchers, such as Bauer and Lashkari (2018) find evidence of economies of scale in the
use of IT.27 Software has large fixed costs and low marginal cost, giving an advantage to
those firms who use it more widely.
However, economies of scale are nothing new. Other technologies exhibit wellknown scale economies, such as steelmaking or electric power generation. Nor is it clear why
second-tier firms cannot also realize scale advantages from software, as they do in the steel
and electricity industries. There is a critical difference. Steel and electricity generation derive
size advantages because of exogenous factors related to the physics of heat generation. In
contrast, the advantages brought by the systems in the above examples derive from their
ability to improve quality and to thereby differentiate the firm from its rivals. The advantages
of these large software systems derive not from absolute size but from an advantage relative
to the size rivals’ systems. Firms endogenously choose the scale of complexity they manage
relative to rivals.

27

Aghion et al. (2019) and de Ridder (2019) provide growth models featuring IT scale economies.
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In other words, investments in these large software systems appear to be
endogenous sunk costs as described by (Sutton 1991).28 Sutton argues that leading firms in
vertically differentiated markets can sink large investments in advertising or R&D to improve
product quality and thereby achieve a large stable market share, creating a “natural
oligopoly.” In equilibrium, firms invest at different levels, they differ in quality and in the
prices they charge. Effectively, the quality investments made by leading firms increase the
revenue gap to follower firms, decreasing the likelihood of leapfrogging. Large investments
in own-account software can also differentiate firms by quality, perhaps at a larger scale. For
example, Ellickson (2007) shows evidence that supermarket distribution systems create a
Sutton-type market structure. Technology that provides greater differentiation at scale
generates industry structures very different from technologies that generate exogenous cost
savings at scale.
These endogenous scale economies provide a succinct explanation for the observed
trends. The emergence of IT systems to manage highly complex environments in the 1990s
might have created new opportunities for firms to compete via large sunk investments in
software, leading to a growing gap between first and second-tier firms and hence declining
displacement.
Other factors may amplify these trends. To the extent that implementation of these
systems depends on particularly skilled managers and/or software developers, some firms
may have unique advantages. Bloom et al. (2012) find that firms with US managers have a
distinct advantage at implementing IT systems. To the extent that these systems depend on
complementary organizations and are tailored to specific organizations, some firms will have

28

See also Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1987).
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greater benefit than others and these advantages will not easily diffuse. Also, some of the
knowledge needed to implement these systems may be blockaded from rivals by intellectual
property restrictions or other means. Andrews et al. (2016) suggest that the diffusion of new
knowledge has slowed (see also Akcigit and Ates 2019). This interpretation is bolstered by
evidence that dominant firm patent stocks have a modest negative impact on leapfrogging
(Table 4).

Markups and Industry Concentration
Economists sometimes speak as if there were a unitary level of competition for each
industry. As we noted in the introduction, price competition might be different from or even
counter to technological or Schumpeterian competition. In this section, we explore how firm
markups and industry concentration—generally taken as measures of competition—relate to
our measure of industry leadership displacement, a measure of Schumpeterian competition.
We calculate firm markups using the method of De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger
(2020) with Compustat data (see Appendix). Figure 5 shows a binned scatterplot of the
mean displacement hazard for top-four firms in each industry-year plotted against the mean
lagged markup of firms in the industry, after controlling for year fixed effects. The plot
shows a modestly upward sloping relationship except at the tails. Table A4 on the Appendix
reports a series of regressions along the lines of Table 2, adding the firm markup lagged one
year. Markups have a significant positive relationship with the displacement of leader firms
across all sectors.
To study industry concentration, we calculate the top four firms’ share of sales in 8digit SIC industries using NETS data for national industries. Figure 6A shows a tight
negative relationship between industry concentration and the displacement hazard for top
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four firms. Figure 6B shows the displacement hazard declining with the HerfindahlHirschman index until the index reaches a value of about 0.25, corresponding to the
threshold for what the Department of Justice considers “highly concentrated.” Regressions
of the displacement hazard against interactions of industry concentration (see Appendix
Table A5) show a highly significant negative relationship with little difference across industry
sectors and with an increase in magnitude after the year 2000. In these data, industry
concentration rose modestly after 2000, corresponding to the parallel decline in displacement
hazards.29 These correlations suggest that rising industry concentration might reflect the
same factors driving a decline in Schumpeterian competition. This association is bolstered by
evidence that the increase in industry concentration at the national level is substantially
driven by the increase in proprietary software spending (Bessen 2020). And it is consistent
with the view that growing endogenous sunk software costs might lead to both higher
concentration and greater persistence of dominant firms (Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983,
1987). On the other hand, it appears that industry concentration has been rising since well
before 2000 (Autor et al. 2020). Also, note that falling industrial concentration at the local
level has accompanied rising concentration at the national level.30

Conclusion
Using multiple measures of the turnover of dominant firms, we find evidence of a
substantial and abrupt change in the nature of competition across most sectors of the US

Using a balanced panel, mean unweighted four-firm industry concentration rose from 72.6% in 2990 to
73.3% in 2014; weighted by industry sales, four-firm concentration rose from 75.2% to 79.4%.
29
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Rinz (2018), Hsieh and Rossi-Hansberg (2019).
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economy beginning in the late 1990s. Schumpeterian competition rose substantially over
previous decades but dropped sharply in a relatively short time since the late 1990s.
This pattern seems quite distinct from the evolution of markups and industry
concentration which have grown steadily since about 1980 (De Loecker, Eeckhout, and
Unger 2020, Autor et al. 2020). Our analysis suggests that these metrics capture different
things. In particular, markups are perhaps a better measure of static price competition than
they are of dynamic technological competition. We find, in fact, that higher markups are
associated with greater industrial dynamism reflected by the displacement of industry leaders.
Furthermore, we analyze the relationship between displacement rates of dominant
firms and a wide array of investments they make, including investments in intangibles, R&D,
organizational capital, acquisitions, software, advertising, and lobbying expenditures.
Contrary to a view that attributes declining competition to lax antitrust merger enforcement
(Grullon et al. 2017), we find that acquisitions by top firms are not significantly associated
with decreased leapfrogging and, in any case, top firms have reduced the number of
acquisitions they make each year since 2000. Nor do we find a substantial role for corporate
lobbying by top firms (Gutierrez and Philippon 2017).
Instead, the evidence is most consistent with an explanation that emphasizes the role
of proprietary software. We find that software stocks are significantly related to lower
displacement rates across a variety of datasets and measures. Moreover, investments by large
firms in self-developed software increased by an order of magnitude beginning in the late
1990s. This surge can account for most of the decline in leapfrogging rates and an
instrumental variable analysis suggests the relationship is causal. Viewing these investments
as endogenous sunk costs (Sutton 1991) provides a parsimonious explanation for the decline
in Schumpeterian competition. Enabled by new technology, leading firms made large
31
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investments in managing complexity to improve the quality of their products and services,
differentiating themselves from rivals and creating a “natural oligopoly.”
Thus, it seems that technology has begun to play a new and different role in the
economy. New technologies have been generally associated with increased disruption of
industries and technology continues to disrupt industries and business models in general
(newspapers, music). But now, it seems, information technology allows dominant firms to
suppress their own “creative destruction,” decreasing disruption in this particular dimension.
The social welfare implications might be ambiguous: while dominant firms use
information technology to improve the quality of their products and services (more features,
greater selection, greater targeting), these firms might use technology to differentiate their
products excessively with an eye toward “business stealing.” Moreover, while this technology
may deliver productivity benefits today, it is not clear that it will diffuse through the rest of
the economy or that future innovators will face restrictions to their growth.
The decline in displacement hazards is not a conventional antitrust problem and it
will not likely be best addressed by simply reinvigorating conventional antitrust policy. This
paper provides methods to measure and analyze changes in displacement hazards, providing
tools for future research on how the persistence of dominant firms affects innovation and
productivity growth and what that means for policy.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1. Best-fit trends with single break for various hazard measures.
Industry
Break
Trend (𝛼)
Change in trend (𝛽)
Hazard measure
measure
year
Compustat data
Displacement from top 6-digit NAICS
4 firms
primary industry

2000

0.0017 (0.0004)***

-0.0046 (0.0009)***

Displacement from top 6-digit NAICS
2 firms
primary industry

2000

0.0027 (0.0005)***

-0.0062 (0.0010)***

Displacement from top 6-digit NAICS
8 firms
primary industry

2000

0.0010 (0.0004)**

-0.0032 (0.0007)***

Displacement from top 6-digit NAICS
4 firms + Exit
primary industry

2000

0.0024 (0.0004)***

-0.0061 (0.0010)***

Leapfrog into top 4
firms (rank 5-9)

6-digit NAICS
primary industry

2001

0.0013 (0.0002)***

-0.0029 (0.0007)***

Displacement from top 4-digit NAICS
4 firms
primary industry

2000

0.0022 (0.0003)***

-0.0055 (0.0008)***

Displacement from top
100 firms
All industries

2003

0.0014 (0.0004)***

-0.0048 (0.0013)***

0.0012 (0.0011)

-0.0047 (0.0019)**

Displacement from top 4-digit SIC industry
1998
4 firm segments
segments
NETS data

Displacement from top 8-digit SIC
1997 0.0057 (0.0028)*
-0.0079 (0.0033)**
4 firms
industries
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Break years are estimated using the
supremum Wald test. The trend and change in trend after the break are determined from a simple OLS
regression of the annual hazard rates on these two terms (see text).
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Table 2. Displacement Hazard and Tangible/Intangible Capital

Productivity

Net PPE

Intangibles

1

2

3

4

5

Base

Ind-year FE

IV

<=2000

>2000

1976-2017

1976-2017

1980-2017

1976-2000

2001-2017

-0.019

-0.066**

-0.099***

-0.102***

-0.032

(0.018)

(0.028)

(0.009)

(0.031)

(0.023)

-0.029***

-0.037***

-0.027***

-0.043***

-0.023***

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.005)

-0.026***

-0.033***

-0.030***

-0.030***

-0.032***

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.005)

Industry FE

x

x

x

x

Year FE

x

x

x

x

22159

15936

10535

Industry x year FE
Observations

x
26471

26471

Adjusted R-squared
0.091
0.067
0.077
0.109
0.091
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Independent variables are in logs. Productivity is estimated by the ACF method. Column 3 instruments
capital stocks using 5-year lagged values.
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Table 3. Hazard estimates with external interactions
Hazard:

Top 4 firm
moves down

Second 4 firm
moves up

-0.006

0.090***

(0.021)

(0.022)

-0.033***

0.039***

(0.004)

(0.003)

-0.035***

0.032***

(0.004)

(0.003)

Subject firm
Productivity
Net PPE
Intangibles

Tangible Capital
Firm 5

0.004

Firm 1

(0.003)
Firm 6

0.001

(0.004)
Firm 2

(0.002)
Firm 7

-0.001
-0.002

-0.002
(0.004)

Firm 3

(0.003)
Firm 8

-0.001

-0.011***
(0.004)

Firm 4

(0.002)

-0.014***
(0.004)

Intangible Capital
Firm 5

-0.001

Firm 1

(0.002)
Firm 6

0.003

(0.004)
Firm 2

(0.003)
Firm 7

0.002
0.004

-0.004
(0.004)

Firm 3

(0.003)
Firm 8

-0.014***

-0.005
(0.005)

Firm 4

-0.006

(0.003)

(0.004)

Observations

14924

13765

R-squared

0.118

0.087

Other firms (probability values)
Joint test of
.261
tangibles
Joint test of
intangibles

.164

.000
.000

Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. All
regressions have industry and year fixed effects. Independent variables are in logs. Productivity is
estimated using the ACF method.

39
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3682745

Table 4. Decomposing Intangibles, Leapfrog hazard
Subject firm
Productivity
Net PPE
R&D
Org. capital
Other intangibles

1
0.093***
(0.023)
0.043***
(0.004)
0.001
(0.002)
0.022***
(0.004)
0.002*
(0.001)

Software Stock
Acquisitions
Advertising

2
0.085***
(0.023)
0.053***
(0.004)

3
0.056***
(0.017)
0.051***
(0.004)

0.003
(0.004)
0.009
(0.006)
0.006**
(0.003)

0.008
(0.005)

-0.003
(0.006)
-0.012***
(0.004)

-0.001
(0.004)
-0.013***
(0.004)

-0.014**
(0.007)
0.002
(0.007)
0.003*
(0.002)

-0.014**
(0.006)

0.012
(0.009)
0.002
(0.004)
0.012***
(0.004)
-0.006
(0.014)

Patents
Lobbying
Top 4 firms (average)
PPE, firm #3
-0.016***
(0.004)
PPE, firm #4
-0.019***
(0.004)
R&D
-0.003
(0.003)
Org. capital
-0.015***
(0.006)
Other intangibles 0.001
(0.002)
Software Stock
Acquisitions
Advertising
Patents
Lobbying

4
0.105***
(0.035)
0.052***
(0.006)

-0.008
(0.007)
-0.018***
(0.007)

-0.003
(0.012)
0.002
(0.002)
0.009
(0.007)
-0.012**
(0.006)

Observations
12964
7706
9140
4088
R-squared
0.086
0.118
0.106
0.133
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Industry
and year fixed effects. Columns 2 and 3 exclude industries where software is a major part of the product.
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Table 5. Displacement hazard at industry level, US
Dependent variable: Displacement of top four firm ranked by sales in US market

All software share

(1)
OLS
-0.412***
(0.120)

(2)
OLS

(3)
IV
-0.911***
(0.219)

(4)
IV

Own-account software share

-0.669**
(0.324)

-2.850*
(1.545)

Prepackaged software share

-0.595
(0.640)

0.455
(2.404)

Custom software share

-0.127
(0.272)

0.283
(0.501)

All equipment share

-0.097
(0.076)

-0.070
(0.097)

-0.235***
(0.083)

-0.158
(0.106)

All structures share

0.072
(0.079)

0.093
(0.095)

0.044
(0.091)

0.110
(0.097)

Observations
1,440
1,440
1,440
1,440
R-squared
0.373
0.374
Note: Standard errors clustered by industry in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. All regressions
have industry and year fixed effects and industries are weighted by firm counts. Independent variables are
in logs. Software share (column 3) and own-account share (column 4) are instrumented using the log
software share of capital for European countries. First stage regressions are highly significant.
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Figure 1. Displacement Hazards

Note: Break years are estimated using the supremum Wald test. The trend and change in trend after the
break are determined from a simple OLS regression of the annual hazard rates on these two terms.
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Figure 2. Mean difference in capital stock by type of top four firms
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Figure 3. Trends in Intangible Stocks of Top Four Firms
A. Levels, Top four firms

B. Difference, top four firms relative to firms ranked 5-9

Note: software line excludes firms in industries where software is a major part of the product.
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Figure 4. Mean acquisitions by top four firms
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Figure 5. Mean Industry Displacement Hazard and Markups

Note: Binned scatter plot from Compustat data 1980-2014, showing mean annual
displacement hazard for 6-digit NAICS industries after controlling for year plotted against
mean industry markup, calculated by the method of De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger 2020.
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Figure 6. Mean Industry Displacement Hazard and Industry Concentration
A. Four-firm share of sales, NETS data

B. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, Sales

Note: Binned scatter plot from NETS data 1990-2014, showing mean annual displacement
hazard for 8-digit SIC industries after controlling for year plotted against industry
concentration measures.
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Appendix
Supplementary Tables
Summary Statistics
Table A1. Mean Log Values, Year 2000

Net Property, Plant, and Equipment
Intangibles
R&D
Organizational Capital
Balance Sheet Intangibles
software Stock
Patent Stock
Acquisition Stock
Advertising/Marketing Stock
Lobbying Stock
Markup

Firm rank
1–4
5.37
5.63
0.74
4.63
2.83
1.07
1.26
1.03
1.02
0.16
1.35

Firm rank
5-8
4.33
4.76
0.34
3.78
1.71
0.59
0.86
0.82
0.66
0.07
1.37
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Sector displacement hazards
Table A2. Displacement Hazard from Top 4 Firms, Best-fit trend with single break
Trend (𝛼)
Change in trend (𝛽)
Data
Break year
Compustat Sector, (6-digit NAICS industries)
Nondurable mfg.

2000

0.0017 (0.0008)**

-0.0052 (0.0016)***

Durable mfg.

1997

0.0032 (0.0007)***

-0.0059 (0.0011)***

Transport, utilities

2003

0.0012 (0.0009)

-0.0059 (0.0021)***

Trade, services

1998

0.0017 (0.0009)*

-0.0052 (0.0015)***

Finance

1999

0.0029 (0.0014)**

-0.0046 (0.0026)*

Farms

2007

0.0014 (0.0010)

-0.0068 (0.0034)*

Oil and gas extraction

2007

0.0010 (0.0020)

-0.0116 (0.0066)*

Mining, except oil and gas

1998

0.0019 (0.0020)

-0.0056 (0.0026)**

Support activities for mining

2000

0.0033 (0.0029)

-0.0063 (0.0041)

Construction

2002

0.0001 (0.0011)

-0.0022 (0.0019)

Transportation equipment

1998

0.0051 (0.0042)

-0.0084 (0.0053)

Retail trade

1995

0.0064 (0.0026)**

-0.0080 (0.0028)***

Broadcasting and telecommunications

2005

0.0031 (0.0014)**

-0.0084 (0.0035)**

Securities, commodity contracts, and investments

2001

0.0035 (0.0021)*

-0.0069 (0.0033)**

Real estate

1997

0.0010 (0.0045)

-0.0040 (0.0054)

Management of companies and enterprises Administrative and support services

2000

0.0015 (0.0019)

-0.0035 (0.0027)

Waste management and remediation services

2005

0.0004 (0.0015)

-0.0060 (0.0041)

Ambulatory health care services

1996

0.0055 (0.0049)

-0.0084 (0.0056)

NETS Sector (8-digit SIC industries

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Break years are estimated using the
supremum Wald test. The trend and change in trend after the break are determined from a simple OLS
regression of the annual hazard rates on these two terms (see text).
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Different production function estimations

Table A3. Displacement hazard using different productivity estimates

Net PPE

Intangibles

Productivity

Observations

Labor
productivity

OLS

Ackerberg,
Caves, Frazer

Levinsohn,
Petrin

Olley, Pakes

-0.0366***

-0.0302***

-0.0253***

-0.0280***

-0.0284***

(0.0023)

(0.0027)

(0.0027)

(0.0027)

(0.0027)

-0.0152***

-0.0262***

-0.0295***

-0.0273***

-0.0268***

(0.0020)

(0.0028)

(0.0029)

(0.0029)

(0.0028)

-0.0143***

-0.0945***

-0.0915***

-0.0889***

-0.0784***

(0.0039)

(0.0078)

(0.0079)

(0.0081)

(0.0089)

29571

27097

27097

27097

26996

Adj. R-squared
0.082
0.093
0.091
0.091
0.087
Note: Dependent variable is displacement from top 4 firms ranked by sales. Standard errors clustered by
firm in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Includes industry and year fixed effects. Independent
variables are in logs.
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Markups and Industry Concentration
Table A4. Displacement Hazards and Markups
Net PPE
Intangibles
Lagged markup

1

2

3

4

5

-0.0494***

-0.0454***

-0.0494***

-0.0494***

-0.0497***

(0.0025)

(0.0027)

(0.0025)

(0.0025)

(0.0025)

-0.0066***

-0.0070***

-0.0066***

-0.0067***

-0.0062***

(0.0019)

(0.0019)

(0.0019)

(0.0019)

(0.0019)

0.0905***

0.0935***

0.0898***

(0.0112)

(0.0175)

(0.0112)

Lag 5 markup

0.0678***
(0.0117)

L.markup x after 2000

-0.0046
(0.0183)

L.markup x High R&D

0.0039
(0.0047)

Lag markup x sector
Nondurable mfg.

0.0999***
(0.0188)

Durable mfg.

0.1136***
(0.0140)

Transportation, utilities

0.0872***
(0.0250)

Wholesale, retail

0.0996***
(0.0227)

Finance

0.0610***
(0.0114)

Services

0.1050***
(0.0116)

Other

0.1334***
(0.0201)

Observations

30189

25603

30189

30189

30189

R-squared
0.112
0.108
0.112
0.112
0.113
Note: Standard errors clustered by industry in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Industry and year
fixed effects. Markups are calculated by the method of De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger 2020.
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Table A5. Displacement Hazards and Industry Four-firm Concentration Ratio
Concentration Ratio

1

2

-0.1284***

-0.1196***

(0.0015)

(0.0017)

After 2000 x concentration

3

-0.0149***
(0.0008)

Sector x concentration
Mining, construction

-0.1262***
(0.0023)

Non-durable manufacturing

-0.1297***
(0.0017)

Durable manufacturing

-0.1282***
(0.0017)

Transportation, utilities

-0.1292***
(0.0027)

Trade

-0.1306***
(0.0017)

Finance

-0.1278***
(0.0030)

Services

-0.1260***
(0.0018)

Other

-0.1196***
(0.0078)

Observations
R-squared

151,896
0.063

151,896
0.050

151,896
0.063

Note: Standard errors clustered by industry in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Industry and year fixed effects. Concentration is industry share of revenues of the top 4
firms in NETS 8-digit SIC industries.
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Markups
De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) assume a revenue production function,
(A1)
𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡
where 𝑞𝑖𝑡 is log deflated revenues for firm i at time t, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is log deflated cost of goods sold,
𝑘𝑖𝑡 is log deflated capital, 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is unobserved productivity, and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is an error term capturing
unanticipated shocks and measurement error. They further assume an AR(1) process so that
(A2)
𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝜔𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 .
They use a two-stage estimation, first regressing
(A3)
𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑘𝑖𝑡 + ℎ(𝑣𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡
where ℎ(𝑣𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘𝑖𝑡 ) is a non-parametric polynomial (we use a quadratic form). This regression
gives us an estimate of predicted output, 𝑞̂𝑖𝑡 , purged of unanticipated shocks and
measurement error. We can then define
(A4)
𝜉̂𝑖𝑡 (𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜌) ≡ (𝑞̂𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝛾𝑘𝑖𝑡 ) − 𝜌(𝑞̂𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 ).
Following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) then have moment conditions
(A5)
𝑣𝑖𝑡−1
𝐸 [𝜉̂𝑖𝑡 (𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜌) (𝑘
)] = 0.
𝑖𝑡−1
Using GMM, we obtain estimates of 𝛽 and calculate markups as
(A6)
𝜇𝑖𝑡 ≡ 𝛽̂ 𝑒

(𝑞𝑖𝑡−𝜖̂𝑖𝑡)⁄
𝑣𝑖𝑡

where 𝜖̂𝑖𝑡 is the residual from (A3).
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